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Abstract: In True Enough, Catherine Elgin (2017) argues against veritism, which is the view 
that truth is the paramount epistemic objective. Elgin’s argument against veritism proceeds from 
considering the role that models, idealizations, and thought experiments play in science to the 
conclusion that veritism is unacceptable. In this commentary, I argue that Elgin’s argument fails 
as an argument against veritism. I sketch a refutation by logical analogy of Elgin’s argument. 
Just as one can aim at gold medals and still find approximations to gold, such as silver and 
bronze medals, to be acceptable and honest achievements in competitive sports, one can aim at 
full truths as the paramount epistemic objective and still find approximations to truth, such as 
models and idealizations, to be acceptable and honest achievements in scientific inquiry. 
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In True Enough, Catherine Elgin (2017, p. 9) argues that “Truth ought not be our paramount 
epistemic objective.” In other words, Elgin argues against a “truth-centered epistemology” or 
veritism, which is the view that truth is the paramount epistemic objective. If “we accept 
[veritism]”, Elgin (2017, p. 9) argues, “we cannot do justice to the epistemic achievements of 
science.” 
 
Elgin’s (2017, p. 11) argument against veritism proceeds from considering the role that models, 
idealizations, and thought experiments play in science to the conclusion that veritism is 
unacceptable. As Elgin (2017, p. 15) writes: 
 
Far from being defects, models, idealizations, and thought experiments figure 
ineliminably in successful science. If truth is mandatory, much of our best science turns 
out to be epistemologically unacceptable and perhaps intellectually dishonest. Our 
predicament is this: We can retain the truth requirement and construe science either as 
cognitively defective or as noncognitive, or we can reject, revise, or relax the truth 
requirement and remain cognitivists about and devotees of science. 
 
Since Elgin (2017, p. 15) takes it for granted that “science provides an understanding of the 
natural order,” she concludes that we should reject veritism in order to “remain cognitivists about 
and devotees of science.”1 
 
Accordingly, Elgin’s argument from scientific models, idealizations, and thought experiments 
against veritism can be stated as follows: 
 
 
1 One might complain that Elgin’s argument against veritism applies to scientific inquiry in particular, not epistemic 
inquiry in general, since the examples she uses to support the premises of her argument against veritism come from 
science (e.g., the Ideal Gas Law) only. In this commentary, then, I restrict the discussion to scientific inquiry in 
particular. 
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(1) If truth is the paramount epistemic objective of scientific inquiry, then scientific models, 
idealizations, and thought experiments are epistemologically unacceptable (because they 
are not entirely true). 
(2) It is not the case that scientific models, idealizations, and thought experiments are 
epistemologically unacceptable (despite being not entirely true). 
 
(3) It is not the case that truth is the paramount epistemic objective of scientific inquiry.2 
 
Elgin has made a similar argument against veritism before, with a particular focus on scientific 
idealizations (emphasis added): 
 
Explanations that adduce the ideal gas law would be epistemically unacceptable if abject 
fidelity to truth were required. Since helium molecules are not dimensionless, mutually 
indifferent, elastic spheres, an account that represents them as such is false. If veritism is 
correct, it is epistemically unacceptable. But, at least if the explanation concerned the 
behavior of helium in circumstances where divergence from the ideal gas law is 
negligible (roughly where temperature is high and pressure is low), scientists are apt to 
find it unexceptionable (Elgin 2004, p. 118). 
 
Here, too, Elgin argues against veritism from the fact that scientific idealizations are 
epistemically acceptable in scientific inquiry. That is, if veritism were true, then scientific 
idealizations would be epistemically unacceptable in scientific inquiry. But scientific 
idealizations are epistemically acceptable in scientific inquiry. Therefore, veritism is not true.3 
 
In this commentary, I will argue that Elgin’s argument fails as an argument against veritism. I 
will sketch a refutation by logical analogy of Elgin’s argument. If the analogy holds, then Elgin’s 
argument against veritism fails to show that “Truth ought not be our paramount epistemic 
objective” in scientific inquiry (Elgin 2017, p. 9). 
 
The analogy is as follows: 
 
truths : scientific inquiry :: gold medals : Olympic Games 
 
That is, in sports competitions, such as those that take place during the Olympic Games, the 
paramount objective of each athlete (or team of athletes) is to win gold medals. Not all athletes 
 
2 Cf. Nawar’s (2019) reconstruction of Elgin’s argument against truth-centered epistemology. 
3 For the purposes of this commentary, I am interested in Elgin’s argument from approximations (e.g., scientific 
models and idealizations) against veritism only, not her further arguments for (non-factive) understanding as the 
paramount epistemic objective of (scientific) inquiry. Of course, Elgin must first show that truth is not the 
paramount epistemic objective of (scientific) inquiry before she can propose that (non-factive) understanding is the 
paramount epistemic objective of (scientific) inquiry; otherwise, she would be begging the question against those 
who think that the paramount epistemic objective of (scientific) inquiry is truth (see, e.g., Rowbottom 2008), or 
knowledge (see, e.g., Bird 2007), or anything else besides (non-factive) understanding (see, e.g., Niiniluoto 2014). 
Moreover, if Elgin were to assume that non-factive (scientific) understanding is the paramount epistemic objective 
of (scientific) inquiry as a premise in her argument against veritism, she would also be begging the question against 
those who think that understanding is factive (see, e.g., Grimm 2006) or quasi-factive (see, e.g., Mizrahi 2012). I am 
not suggesting that Elgin’s argument from approximations against veritism is question-begging. In fact, as I have 
construed it, it says nothing about the paramount epistemic objective of scientific inquiry, except that it is not truth. 
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(or teams of athletes) will win gold medals, of course, and so some have to be content with silver 
medals, bronze medals, or no medals at all. Nonetheless, it is still a great achievement to win a 
silver medal. It is also a great achievement to win a bronze medal. No athlete would argue that 
silver medals and bronze medals are unacceptable or dishonest achievements in competitive 
sports. Silver medals and bronze medals are acceptable and honest achievements in competitive 
sports; it’s just that gold medals are even greater achievements. 
 
By analogy, scientific models, idealizations, and thought experiments are epistemically 
acceptable and intellectually honest achievements in science, as premise (2) of Elgin’s argument 
states. But it is still the case that truths are even greater epistemic achievements than scientific 
models, idealizations, and thought experiments, which are approximations or “felicitous 
falsehoods” as Elgin (2017, p. 29) calls them, insofar as truths are more accurate than 
approximations or useful falsehoods. In other words, one can aim at truth as the paramount 
epistemic objective and still find approximations or useful falsehoods, such as scientific models 
and idealizations, to be epistemically acceptable and intellectually honest achievements in 
scientific inquiry just as one can aim at gold medals as the paramount objective and still find 
approximations to gold, such as silver and bronze medals, to be acceptable and honest 
achievements in competitive sports. That is: 
 
 models/idealizations : scientific inquiry :: silver/bronze medals : Olympic Games 
 
Accordingly, to argue that truth is not the paramount epistemic objective of scientific inquiry 
because we find things that are less than fully true (namely, scientific models and idealizations) 
to be epistemically acceptable and intellectually honest achievements in scientific inquiry is like 
arguing that gold medals are not the paramount objective of competitive sports because we find 
things that are less than fully gold (namely, silver and bronze medals) to be acceptable and 
honest achievements in competitive sports. If the argument fails in the context of Olympic sports, 
which it clearly does, then it fails in the context of scientific inquiry as well.4 
 
If this is correct, then Elgin’s argument from approximations against veritism fails to show that 
veritism is unacceptable. Just as one can find silver and bronze medals to be acceptable and 
honest achievements while aiming at gold medals as the paramount objective in Olympic sports, 
one can find approximations to truth and useful falsehoods to be epistemically acceptable and 
intellectually honest achievements while still aiming at truth as the paramount epistemic 
objective in scientific inquiry. Accordingly, my refutation by logical analogy of Elgin’s 
argument from approximations against veritism can be summed up as follows: 
 
(1) If truth is not the paramount epistemic objective of scientific inquiry because 
approximations to truth (i.e., scientific models and idealizations) are acceptable and 
honest achievements in science, then gold medals are not the paramount objective of 
 
4 From reading her (1993), one might get the impression that Elgin would argue that pictures pose a special problem 
for veritism, since they are not the sort of things that can be bearers of truth. As Elgin herself writes in her (2017), 
however, pictures, like models, are representations. As such, they can be more or less accurate. As Elgin (2017, p. 
251) writes, “Pictures, equations, graphs, charts, and maps represent their subjects by denoting them. They are 
representations of the things they denote. It is in this sense that scientific models represent their target systems: they 
denote them.” Being representations just as models are, then, it seems that, for Elgin, pictures do not pose a special 
problem for veritism (any more than scientific models and idealizations already do). 
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Olympic sports because approximations to gold medals (i.e., silver and bronze medals) 
are acceptable and honest achievements in competitive sports. 
(2) It is not the case that gold medals are not the paramount objective of Olympic sports 
because approximations to gold medals (i.e., silver and bronze medals) are acceptable 
and honest achievements in competitive sports. 
 
(3) It is not the case that truth is not the paramount epistemic objective of scientific inquiry 
because approximations to truth (i.e., models and idealizations) are acceptable and honest 
achievements in science. 
 
If this argument is sound, then Elgin’s argument from approximations fails to show that veritism 
is unacceptable. Just as scientific “models, idealizations, and thought experiments figure 
ineliminably in successful science” (Elgin 2017, p. 15), silver and bronze medals figure 
ineliminably in successful sports. In Olympic sports, silver and bronze medals are acceptable and 
honest achievements while gold medals are still the paramount objective. Similarly, in science, 
scientific models and idealizations could be acceptable and honest achievements while truths 
could still be the paramount epistemic objective. The mere fact that we deem some epistemic 
achievements of science that fall short of full truth epistemically acceptable and intellectually 
honest does not show that truth is not the paramount epistemic objective of science. 
 
To this, it might be objected that there is a relevant dissimilarity between scientific 
approximations (such as scientific models and idealizations) and approximations in sports (such 
as silver and bronze medals). Scientific approximations play a crucial role in science, such that 
they make success in science possible, whereas approximations in sports do not, or so it might be 
argued. But this is not the case. Just as scientific models and idealizations play a crucial role in 
scientific inquiry, such that they make success in science possible, silver and bronze medals play 
a crucial role in competitive sports, such that they make success in Olympic sports possible. For 
an athlete (or a team) to be the most successful in a sports competition, and thereby worthy of a 
gold medal, there must be other athletes (or teams) who are less successful, and thereby worthy 
of silver or bronze medals, or no medals at all. Similarly, for a scientific model to be successful, 
there must be other models that are less successful than it. After all, the evaluation of competing 
models in science, just like the evaluation of competing athletes (or teams) in sports, is 
comparative: one is more or less successful in comparison to others.5 As Wray (2018, p. 4) puts 
it, “when scientists are choosing a theory [or a model], they are seldom choosing between more 
than a few competing theories [or models] and [...] their evaluations of competing theories [or 
models] are comparative in nature.” In that respect, just as scientific “models, idealizations, and 
thought experiments figure ineliminably in successful science” (Elgin 2017, p. 15), silver and 
bronze medals figure ineliminably in successful sports. In competitive sports, silver and bronze 
medals are acceptable and honest achievements although gold medals are still the paramount 
objective. Similarly, scientific models and idealizations could be epistemically acceptable and 
intellectually honest achievements although truths could still be the paramount epistemic 
objective of scientific inquiry. 
 
It might also be objected that there is another relevant dissimilarity between approximations in 
science and approximations in sports. Sometimes an approximation or a useful falsehood may be 
 
5 On comparative theory evaluation in science, see Lipton (1993), Wray (2012), and Mizrahi (2013). 
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better than accurate models or true theories, whereas gold medals are always better than silver 
and bronze medals. As Elgin (2017, p. 30) puts it, an approximation or a useful falsehood “may 
make cognitive contributions that the unvarnished truth cannot match.” Elgin (2017, p. 30) gives 
the example of “a first-order partial differential equation” that “describes how air flows directly 
over an airplane wing,” but “does not admit of an analytic solution,” and claims that, in this case, 
the “approximation [...] is more fruitful than the truth” insofar as it “can serve as evidence for or 
constraints on future inquiry.” If approximations or useful falsehoods can be better than truths in 
terms of being “fruitful,” i.e., “serving as evidence for or constraints on future inquiry” (Elgin 
2017, p. 30), then the same can be said about approximations in sports. For instance, if it 
impossible for an athlete to win a silver medal in the 2020 Olympic Games, and so she has to be 
content with a bronze medal, this achievement can then serve as a guide to future competitions. 
That is, from her achievement in the 2020 Olympic Games, our athlete can learn what she needs 
to do in order to win a silver medal in the 2022 Olympic Games. Winning a bronze medal can 
also help our athlete land endorsements, sponsorships, and contracts that winning a gold medal 
might not be able to, which would then put her in a better position to win a silver medal in the 
2022 Olympic Games. In that sense, winning a bronze medal could be more fruitful than winning 
a gold medal, just as “a first-order partial differential equation that approximates the truth, but 
admits of an analytical solution,” is more fruitful than “a second-order partial differential 
equation that exactly describes fluid flow in a boundary layer,” but that “no one knows how to 
solve” (Elgin 2017, p. 30). 
 
More importantly, none of this would change the fact that winning a gold medal would still be 
the paramount objective of our athlete. Her achievement in the 2020 Olympic Games might be 
more fruitful for her insofar as it could land her endorsements, sponsors, and the like. But she 
would still aim to win a gold medal the next time she competes in the Olympic Games. In other 
words, the fact that a bronze medal was more fruitful than a gold medal for our athlete does not 
show that her paramount objective was not to win gold medals. Similarly, the fact that an 
approximation or useful falsehood was more fruitful than an exact equation for “fluid 
dynamicists” (Elgin 2017, p. 30) does not show that their paramount objective was not to find an 
exact equation. So truth can still be the paramount epistemic objective in scientific inquiry, even 
if approximations or useful falsehoods can sometimes be more fruitful than exact equations, 
accurate models, or true theories. If this is correct, then the analogy still holds. In competitive 
sports, silver and bronze medals are acceptable and honest achievements, which can sometimes 
be preferable to golds medals, and yet gold medals are still the paramount objective. Similarly, 
scientific models and idealizations could be acceptable and honest achievements, which can 
sometimes be preferable to accurate models and true theories, and yet truths could still be the 
paramount epistemic objective of scientific inquiry. So, again, from the mere fact that we deem 
some epistemic achievements of science that fall short of full truth epistemically acceptable and 
intellectually honest it does not follow that truth is not the paramount epistemic objective of 
science. 
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